Old Paper: 1(?)

Philosophy Paper 2

Ranen Erdahl

11/15/17

How one ought to behave, which has come to be defined as morality, is a question to which many has tried to answer, in various ways, over of the course of human history. Hume, as an empiricist, hold that morality is based in sentiment. By which he means that all moral codes are based in something which is valued because it is valued. Wollstonecraft, as a rationalist, holds that reason can guide one to all moral truths. By which she means that pure logic can show one all moral truths. Wollstonecraft attempts to show this in the Vindication of the Rights of Women by reasonably arguing for women’s right to education. Yet many of the arguments Hume makes can be see in Wollstonecraft’s paper despite its best efforts. This is not to say that the arguments made by Wollstonecraft are not extremely well reasoned as it is quite the contrary.  But when these moral arguments are broken down, it becomes clear that they are as Hume stated they would be, based in sentiment. Such a review would not be taken by a rationalist, such as Wollstonecraft, as complementary, but the arguments of Hume demonstrate this to be so. Furthermore, some of the arguments put forth by Wollstonecraft are purely sentimental, and their reasonability can be shown to be only an additional support. Nowhere is the accuracy of Hume’s claims better shown than a paper like Wollstonecraft’s, because it becomes clear that even a staunch rationalist can not make arguments regarding morality without somehow appealing to the sentimental that they so very despises. When applying Hume’s arguments to Wollstonecraft’s paper one sees clearly that moral truths are based in the sentimental.

An argument Wollstonecraft would give for the supreme value of reason is it necessary in teaching the other moral imperatives as she states “If children are to be educated to understand the true principle of patriotism, their mother must be a patriot;” (4). So whatever values society insisted upon, reason shall be used to teach those values. This would show reason to be the most desirable, because it is a necessary condition for teaching all other things found to be desireable. What Wollstonecraft claims then, it that reason is the means by which one reaches all other moral imperatives. And because moral imperatives are an ends, and one cannot reach an ends without a means. It follows that reason, which is the means, must be of more value than the other moral imperatives, which are the ends. However once reason has located the other moral imperatives, reason has lost its value as a moral imperatives. This so because once reason has taught the other morals imperatives, then reason has done the what makes it a moral imperative. But the other moral imperatives will continue to do what makes them moral imperatives. The only time this will not be true is if another moral imperative is used to find other moral imperatives, but then that initial moral imperative will, like reason, have done the what makes it a moral imperatives. Reason then, has been reasoned to be less valuable than the other moral imperative, because, unlike other moral imperatives, it will cease to be a moral imperative. But if one reasons that a moral imperative is more valuable if it continues to be a moral imperative, then a moral imperative is value for the thing which lets it continue to be a moral imperative. It follows then that what allows the moral imperatives to continue being moral imperatives is more valuable than those moral imperatives. These other moral imperatives have been shown to be the ends, and the ends do not exist without the means to locate them which is reason. Reason then is more valuable than the moral imperatives it finds, because it allows these imperatives to be imperatives. But also not as valuable as other moral imperatives, because it does not continue to be an imperative. What follows then is that reason more valuable than the other moral imperatives, because other moral imperatives are more valuable than reason. And here one can see Hume’s objection to pure reason when judging value; If one uses reason without sentiment, then the arguments are forced into circularity. Without sentiment reason cannot produce judgements as Hume states “it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation.” (Emmanuel 196).

But this seems to be known to Wollstonecraft, because there are two cases in which she falls into the use of sentiment. The first use of sentiment is an appeal to the unfair consequences of continuing as her society does. The consequences are summarized as the dangers faced by women left without a husband stated as “When reason is taken at second hand, yet she cannot ensure the life of her protector; he may die and leave her with a large Family.” (Wollstonecraft 52). Wollstonecraft conceded very early on that men and women are not purely equal citing the example of physical strength, yet there is no reason given for ignoring the value of physical strength. strength still holds certain uses in society, and that these uses have valuable parts to play. That strength is considered a masculine trait would of course provide men with an advantage, but it can be reasoned that if a trait contributes more value to society then those with this trait will ended up advantaged. It can be shown then that natural disadvantages may arise depending on what is value. But Wollstonecraft does not reason that her example is not a natural disadvantage, instead she states that this consequence is clearly immoral. Wollstonecraft would argue that when one uses reason, it is clearly immoral to leave one is this position. Very well, but exactly is immoral then? Surely the leaving is the immoral act for it is the leaving that forces a women into this position. So the act of divorcing is immoral, because it is the action of leaving that is spoke of. Another action which can be considered as leaving would be death, so when a male dies he becomes immoral. But Wollstonecraft would not agree with such arguments, so she must mean that society is immoral for not protecting all it members. But society is also responsible for protecting the interest of the larger group, which may, it is accepted, sometimes disadvantaged certain individual members. What remains than an arguments over whether the society or the individual holds more importance. Whether one views individuals as a means to a societal end or society as means to an individualists end that results will be the same. when one breaks down what it is found to be important about either the society or individual, what shall be found is a thing which is valued because it is valued. Or if one so choose to drive themselves into madness, they may argue into circularity. Here then we find yet another moral truth which must be based on a sentiment to be truth, so as Hume states “It appears evident that the ultimate ends of human action… recommend themselves entirely to the sentiment of mankind,” (Emmanuel 199). 

While stating that women should have the right to a proper education, Wollstonecraft joins the cries against masculine women “If by this appellation men mean to inveigh against their ardour in hunting, shooting, and gaming, I shall most cordially join in the cry;” (8). In context of this text Wollstonecraft means to condemn the idea that reason is masculine, so there are two possibilities which must be allowed. Either Wollstonecraft does not believe this, but holds the acquiring the right to reason in higher regards. Or Wollstonecraft has found something women ought not do, which far from unprecedented in her time. Nor is it unprecedented in the history of feminism taking as example abortion rights. Perhaps Wollstonecraft does not believe this, but places reason in higher regards. Yet Wollstonecraft argues that men and women are equals in the ways which matter to modern society, and for this to be true women ought to be able to hunt. One may argue that this can be eventuality be reasoned, but then the question arise of why Wollstonecraft does not do this while cover the variety of arguments that she does. Perhaps then Wollstonecraft does not consider this topic important enough to argue for, but the result of this regard is the same as not believing in this right. That result being that it is acceptable to disregard certain women’s right when Wollstonecraft does it. Either one argues for equality of rights between the sexes, or one does not. Wollstonecraft does not argue for one of these rights, and therefore does not argue, at least in totality, for equality. Wollstonecraft then, argue for reason, but not equality. And reason may be used to argue for equality, but, as has been shown, without sentiment it will end in circularity. Or Wollstonecraft does, in fact, take a sentimental stance against masculine women while arguing for the equal rights of women, which would include a women right to be more masculine if they so chose to do so. In any case one sees that Hume is correct when he states.“Nothing remains but to feel, on our part, some sentiment of blame or approbation; whence we pronounce the action criminal or virtuous.” (Emmanuel 198). One cannot reason to the end result of their morals. A value judgement requires the use of sentiment to avoid falling into absurdities, as has been show.

This conclusion may lead Wollstonecraft to dismiss the value of any moral philosophy, and, perhaps, even concede that Rousseau has a point when he to halt the progress of reason in both sexes. If its truth cannot be shown by reason, then it is of no to a rationalist, such Wollstonecraft. And if there no moral code that reason can show to be true, then there is no reason not to go back to the morals of the stone age. Hume would fined this to be absurd, because very few people have a sentiment for the stone age. Nor would Hume want to go back to the stone age, his society offer him far more comfort than the stone age. Certain sentiments seems to offer more, and Hume would likely admit this. But the moral advancements are based in sentiments, and this is Hume’s finer point. The judgements which advance society were made using the sentiment of comfort. And it was, indeed, a sentiment as today one can shown may health benefit to doing thing which are not considered comfortable. Yet what one decided to do with this knowledge is also sentiment, because the choice one makes is based in something which is valued because it is valued. Reason can neither decide which choice is more valued, nor which choice can be condemned. What one chooses to value can only be determined by the sentiment one most agrees with. 

Reason is a useful tool, when it has a starting point. But no amount of reason, it seems, is capable of determine how one finds that starting point. Without the use of sentiment one finds that a starting point argues itself into either endlessness or circularity. Unless one stops at point in which something is valued because it is valued in which case one ceases any sort of valid reasoning. What remains then, as Hume also concludes, is the unreasonable value of human sentiment.